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Slave raiders and their 'people without history'
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W hè n travelling through Baghuinni (now Chad) in 1850-54, the famous
explorer Barth recorded his deep astonishment at meeting an old blind Fulani
who had read Plato and Aristotle, studied in Yemen and at Azhar University
in Egypt, and was considered an expert in calculus.
l couki scarcely have expected to l'ind in ihis out-of-the-way place a man not
only versed in all branches ol' Arabic literature, bul who had even read (nay
possessed a manuscript of) those portions of Aristotle and Plato which had
been translaiecl into... Arabic, and who possessed the most intimate knowledge
of the lands hè had visited (Barth 1857,111: 373).
The German doctor, sounding out trade opportunities in West Africa, was
impressed with the cosmopolitan character of the savanna states that hosted
him. Traveling from emirate to emirate, from Bornu court to Fulani-ruled
Sokoto, hè was received as the emissary of a distant hut equal, though infidel,
sovereign. The genera! attitude of African rulers toward their European
colleagues was one of mild condescension.
The empires that so impressed Barth, were formed in a series of expan-
sionist waves through which Islam wrote much of the history of West Africa
(Clarke 1982) from the ninth to the eighteenth Century. Of course, as with
European expansion, this history was written by the conquerors, the organized
emirates resulting from the varions holy wars. Yet the shock waves of these
movements did reach far into their periphery, affecting 'people without
history'. Following Wolf, I will sketch some effects of Islamic expansion in
West Africa at the societies at their imperia! fringe, indicating the impact that
state formation had on these peoples. In doing so, I shall compare two
marginalized peoples, assessing how their social organization and style of life
may have been influenced by their involvement in and reaction to these large
scale historical processes.
Such groups are mentioned in passing by Wolf as 'losers ... pushed into
fringe areas' (Wolf 1982: 230), living in 'target zones of slave-raiders', which
hè calls 'shatter zones'. One example hè describes is Central Nigeria, where
the slave-raids from the south overlapped those of the northern emirates. For
the most part, however, Wolf concentrâtes on areas closer to metropolitan
centers, though his conclusions apply to more marginal peoples as well. In this
article I shall take a close look at two such groups, each living in its own shatter
zone. North Cameronn and the Nis?er bend in rentrai Mali , re.xne.ct ive.lv the.
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Kapsiki/Higi1 and the Dogon2 (see map). My organizing question is: What
aspects of their respective cultures might be traced back to their interaction
with the Muslim emirates, their main struggle with 'history'? In the two areas
this influence has been, first and foremost, that of slavery; both régions had a
considérable importance for the realms in question as slave reserves. The
pervasiveness of slave raidingon its'host' culture wil! be traced bydelineating
the commonalities of the two cases, and pointing out the relevant différences.
Finally, their divergent stratégies for coping with outside threats will be linked
to their spécifie place in history for a tentative explanation, leading to some
refinements and modifications of Wolfs analysis for the study of other 'people
without history'.
Commonalities
In both North Cameroon and Mali, people live in a dry savanna/sahelian
environment, where sedentary cultivation of millet, sorgo and maize is sup-
plemented with husbandry: sheep, goats and cattle. Both habitats are mountain-
ous, relatively densely populated and quite intensively cultivated, to capacity.
Cultivation technology is of the classical African iron type, working units are
relatively small. Subsistence cultivation relies on a broad spectrum of food crops,
with some cash crops of recent introduction supplementing the family budgets.
Both groups have lived for a long time in their area, over four centuries probably,
and in both instances their oral tradition is replète with taies of slave raids and
wars. A continuous threat of war and enslavement is the constant background
factor in all local village histories. These two areas, the Niger benei and North
Cameroon, were situated at the margin of a number of Muslim empires, formed,
dissolved and reconstituted in the course of West African history.
Like numerous other groups populating the Mandara mountains of North
Cameroon, the Kapsiki had to cope with the great Kanem-Bornu empire,
North of their territory. This emirate, with dynastie roots going back to the
eighth Century B.C. (Urvoy 1949), held sway over the région for more than a
millennium, making it one of the stablest of African realms. To the east of the
Mandara range, the Baghuirmi were active (Pâques 1977), whereas the
Mandara3 formed the nucleus of a smal 1er emirate justnorth of the mountains.
The fourth enemy, the one the Kapsiki suffered most from, since the beginning
of the nineteenth Century, was the Fulani-dominated Sokoto empire (Van
Beek 1988a). For all these empires, the Kapsiki, like other groups of the
Mandara range, formed a fringe people, a reservoir for a slave hungry Muslim
society, and as such was of crucial importance for these empires.
Far to the West, the Dogon had to cope with other emirates. The Bandiagara
plateau, ending at the southeast in the so-cal!ed falaise CclifH of Banriiauara
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has been inhabited by the Dogon since the fifteenth Century, as it was before
their arrivai by other groups. Cliff and scree have served, too, as a defensive
setting against a series of enemies. For them, the empire of Mali or Mandé
(Levtzion 1973) must have been crucial, as today they thernselves still
acknowledge, Whether the Dogon were already on the spot during the
flowering of the Mali empire, or settled at the cliff during the death throes of
that great realm, is uncertain (Dieterlen 1941). Also the Songhai empire, as
well as the Mossi kingdom, threatened them in their habitat (Hunwick 1976).
In the nineteenth Century, roughly at the same time the Fulani founded their
Sokoto empire in Nigeria, the Fulani of Masina (Ba and Daget 1962; Brown
1978) formed a major threat for the Dogon. After beating the Fulani, the
Tucolor, led by El Hadj Umar, scourged the cliff, though in his case the Dogon
of the plateau around Bandiagara were more or less integrated into his armies
(Clarke 1982).
Local oral histories recount numerous slave raids, on a large or a small scale,
skirmishes in which the bows and arrows of the cultivators were matched against
thé lances, shields and sometimes guns of a mounted cavalry. Still, though they
were 'outgunned' in this preindustrial arms race, thé cultivators sometimes
scored astonishing victories. Glorying in thé losses they inflicted on thé enemy,
they still relish taies of old battles, counting their own losses, in slaves or dead,
with an astonishing equanimity. So they were never an easy target, as exemplified
by one of the most famous émirs of Bornu, who died during a slave raid in thé
Mandara area (Urvoy 1949: 243). The habitats of both the Dogon and thé
Kapsiki still echo the continuous threat of enslavement. The Kapsiki lived (and
to some extent still live) on top of the volcanic outcroppings dotting their
plateau, or on thé steep slopes of their mountain ranges. For thé Dogon défense
depended on thé falaise itself, with ils numerous fissures cutting through thé rim
of this huge slab of sandstone on the one hand, and the boulder strewn scree
draped like a long ribbon along thé cliff side (see schematic cross-sections of
both habitats). Both peoples lived at those places least accessible to horses;
incidentally, in thé vicinity of both habitats, a flood plain offered a similar refuge
for other peoples. Finally, in both instances, threats originated not only from
outside, but also from inside; internai war was a constant companion to slave
raids. In this respect, though, a différence between thé two cases must be noted,
as in thé Kapsiki case thé intensity of internai war must have been much higher
than in the Niger bend.
So for safety people built their houses only on défendable spots, and cleared
their fields in the immédiate vicinity. Kapsiki/Higi fields were situated around
the outcroppings, or on the slopes thernselves, whereas the Dogon cultivated
primarily those fields in sight of the plateau rim (Van Beek 1982a). In both
instances one can speak of closed resources during the era of the slave raids.
t K A
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colonialis, German and British for the Kapsiki/Higi and French for the Dogon,
opened up the plains and plateau as a cultivation area. After pacification both
Kapsiki and Dogon rapidly dispersed themselves over the formerly dangerous
out-fields, quickly covering up the newly available territory.
Both groups, each in its own fashion, are fairly clear examples of what Wolf
calls 'kin ordered modes of production': reproduction, recruitment of labour
and access to means of production are all articulated in terms of kinship.
Coresidence, Wolf correctly indicates, is more important than actual kin
relations, a principle that for each group has different conséquences. As Wolf
notes: 'access to resources is restricted and available only to claimants with a
"kinship license"' (1982: 91 ). In this case, the social organisation geared to this
aspect of the mode of production, is quite similar in both cases.
The main, if not the only, sociopolitical unit is the village. Both the Kapsiki and
Dogon villages - though their appearance is strikingly different - form the
dominant contexts of social life. A few ritual obligations and historie ties may
traascend the village and can be important in times of crisis like drought or locusts.
The village communities have a high degree of political autonomy, as they have
their own clearly defined borders and local histories, in which migration traditions
predominate. Politics is not very centralized; village heads have just a few ritual
obligations, as have clan and lineage elders, though their influence in daily life can
be larger. Neither among the Dogon nor among the Kapsiki can headmanship
serve as a power basis for the man in question; conflict resolution, for instance, is
highly informal, not dependent on spécifie functionaries.
The way of choosing a headman is different for Kapsiki and Dogon. In the
Cameroonian case a représentative of one particular clan will be chosen,
whereas in a Dogon village the oldest man automatically becomes the ritual
leader, assisted by a younger kinsman, often a grandson4. The village itself, in
both instances, is made up of several wards and has at its core a System of
patrilineal clans and lineages, which may be associated with the wards. The
clan system does not reach over the village border: another village, another
set of patriclans. The system of adoption offers some flexibility for the agnatic
system in Kapsiki, as does complementary filiation for the Dogon. Anyway,
descent and identity are closely intertwined, while corporate characteristics
may vary. The patriclans are, usually, exogamous, marriage résidence being
virilocal, with a tenclency toward village endogamy (especially for the Dogon).
Clans are grouped into two phratries, which the Dogon locate each in its own
village half, while the Kapsiki intermingle them. In both cases, a minor ritual
hierarchy typifies this dua! division. Clan membership is crosscut by endo-
gamous artisan groups. Blacksmiths (Kapsiki and Dogon) and leatherworkers
(Dogon) form separate layers of society, associated with spécifie tasks as weil
as, for the Kapsiki, the notion of pollution (Van Beek 1987), though their
religious function is more crystallized among the Kapsiki.
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Both languages hardly give rise to a we-feeling beyond the village level. For
the Kapsiki/Higi language at least eight major dialects can be discerned
(Mohrlang 1972; Barreteau 1984). Dogon has a dozen dialects and is almost
as fragmented (Calame-Griaule 1968) as Kapsiki.
For both groups, religion is relatively complex. A system of major cyclic rituals,
more or less tied in to rites de passage (especially in the Kapsiki case), is
supplemented by a sharply defined system of sacrifices, following the social
echelons of the village: individual, household, ward, lineage, clan, village half and
village. Sacrifice itself follows a strict order in both cases, with divination
sometimes a steering mechanism. The pantheons of Kapsiki and Dogon, however,
differ largely, though in both cases the rôle of ancestors is very limited.
Différences
Though more commonalities could be mentioned, this genera! picture indi-
cates that we have two societies with a similar ecological situation, political
history and social organization. Their différences, as we shall see, become
apparent mostly on the level of ideology, and what one might call 'style of life',
the spécifie mode of interaction between members of the same society.
Interna! war between villages, as indicated, was much more intense in the
case of the Kapsiki. The series of skirmishes between Kapsiki villages in fact
formed both a continuous threat and a cherished male activity. With some
regularity, villages warred with each other for mimerons reasons, following a
strict fighting code (Van Beek 1987). The use of weaponry escalated with the
social distance between combatants, consonant with the classical segmentary
lineage model. While fights within the clan could only be fought with wooden
clubs, different clans armed their warriors with iron weapons. Only in battles
between unrelated villages were bow and arrow, i.e. poison, allowed. The
latter wars aimed at catching slaves as well, often to have them bought back
by their kinsmen. War was a central aspect of social life, glory in battle a central
focus of community values.
The Dogon, on the other hand, did have some internai skirmishes, but these
were few and far less important. Their raids were limited to occasional groups
of youngsters, avenging affronts by peers from a neighbouring village who had
infringed on their territory, i.e. were after 'their girls'. No slaves were caught,
and no cases of manslaughter are reported. Thus, the Kapsiki had many more
domestic slaves than the Dogon, who hardly bought or sold any slaves. For
them, paying ransom for a kinsman caught by a Muslim was the only slavery
transaction, though they did use other kinsmen in the exchange. Consequently
slavery was a normal institution in Kapsiki villages, an exception at the
Bandiagara/a/öwe.
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The value Systems vary accordingly. The Kapsiki strive for individual
autonomy: a person should be free from restraining ties to his fellow men, be
they kin or not. He or she may call upon clan members for help, but should
beware that these kinsmen demand too much of one's property, time and
labour. A definite work ethic, albeit an individual one, pervades the value
system: any individual should work hard and be as autarkie as possible,
economically as well as politically. In social interaction this implies an
assertive attitude, protecting one's privacy, shielding the private sphère from
the unwarranted intrusion of outsiders. Gunning, meaning to be smarter and
trickier than the other, is thus a valued faculty (Van Beek 1982b).
By contrast, the Dogon have a strong orientation toward harmony and
continuous communion with members of clan and village. Conflicts should be
avoided, and différences of opinion should never be raised. Not only are they
very much aware of their mutual interdépendance, they cherish it too,
accentuating it wherever they can. An individual Dogon easily gives expression
to his or her dependency on and belonging to the larger group, which not only
indicates a descent group or âge set, also a category of persons. Thus, the old
thank the young and vice versa, the collectivity of men praise the women (and
vice versa) during one of the central rituals. Communal labour, collective
action and group responsibility are characteristic of Dogon village life.
Hospitality and openness are essential values: each Dogon should be ac-
cessible at ail times to anyone. For instance, whereas thé Dogon language
knows many ways of welcoming a stranger, Kapsiki knows no équivalent for
'welcome'. For them strangers are enemies, without any rights, while thé
Dogon consider them as guests, from whom 'new words' can be heard and
information from thé outside world gleaned.
Property rights in fields, trees or houses show some variation between thé
two. Kapsiki rights are, in principle, individualized. Major property rights
belong to those who claim and clear a field for the first time or plant a tree.
With time these rights will be fragmentated among their descendants, up to
thé level of a sub-lineage. Thus, thé effective corporate group consists of men
who are each other's potential heirs, a source of conflict. The Dogon situation
is more complicated. Rights for thé infields, i.e. those under permanent
cultivation through manuring, are assigned on the basis of âge: the oldest men
of the village, ward and clan each hâve their fixed share of thèse coveted fields,
thé acreage increasing with increasing seniority. For the outfields the structure
of thé lineages is followed, which in itself is more corporate than is the case
with thé Kapsiki. Conflicts within thé lineage are very rare indeed among thé
Dogon.
Marriages form an important link between thé lineages. However, both
marriage Systems do cliffer considerably - even spectacularly - as does the
concomitant relation between men and women Knnsik-i mîirr iawp k (»v
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unstable. Among them, as in the whole of the Mandara area, secondary
marriages are well institutionalized: after her first marriage each woman,
almost without exception, leaves her husband sooner or later, in search of
another, possibly better, partner. Thus, in thé course of their marital career
women tour some six spouses, each in another village (Van Beek 1987). The
gréât frequency of this type of marriage means a divorce-ratio of 96 per cent
(Van Beek 1986b). As a conséquence of this extrême situation relatively little
émotion is invested in husband-wife relationships; partners distrust each other
and keep their lives quite separate. Brideprices, high despite the fragility of
thé marriage bonds, do form an important focus of men's lives. Claims for
brideprice restitution form the single major case type for indigenous courts,
as brideprices are strictly associated with rights over children. Polygyny, a very
important structural feature of this marriage complex, implies that each
husband strives for as many wives and children as hè can get and keep in his
compound.
Dogon marriage, on thé contrary, shows a quite différent face. Hère, too,
marriage is virilocal and at least potentially polygynous. However, theirs is a
System of stable marriages5, characterized by a long, easygoing initial phase
(Paulme 1940), during which partner switching is still possible. The tendency
toward village endogamy is strong, exogamy rules are few, so husband and wife
usually hâve plural kin relations with each other, much more than thé Kapsiki
would tolerate. Dogon marriage knows no brideprice or any form of major
économie transaction; thé groom just helps his future father in law out with
thé cultivation of his field together with his âge set, with some symbolic
présents portraying thé son-in-law as an indefatigable worker. The real
compensation for thé wife-giving family occurs in thé form of a child, who
remains with thé wife's parents after weaning. On thé whole, thé Dogon do
not worry much about thé child's whereabouts, as long as it is cared for.
Consequently, paternity trials, so common in Kapsiki, never occur among thé
Dogon.
Age sets as mentioned above are absent among Kapsiki, save for a close
friendship among boys initiated in thé same year, with no structural arrange-
ment in village social organization. Dogon, however, are very much into âge
and seniority, one of their major structural criteria. They know a quota System
of âge sets, each set being formed as enough young men have corne of âge. In
thé many forms of communal work these groups perforrn the most laborious
tasks, and as such they are vital for thé organization of the many 'public works'
a Dogon village knows: repairing thé stairs leading onto thé falaise, roofing a
men's hut, working on the housing of a project officer, etc. In thèse cases thé
old men of thé village just cry out in thé dark, requesting such and such âge
sets to be présent on thé morrow. Thèse groups crosscut thé lineage and ward
oreanization of thé village, but do not transcend thé villaee level.
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A correlated différence is the genera! view on âge. For the Kapsiki âge as
such is not respected; they value the industrious, independent strong adult,
who needs nobody, works hard and feeds himself and many others. Old age
brings dependency, unproductivity and poverty, hence loss of status. Thus, old
men gradually lose their wives, while old women are wholly dependent on their
sons for their livelihood; in short, wi thout a living son, old age is hard indeed.
In village politics age is of no importance; there, the rieh and strong are heard,
i.e. those who have their compounds fü l l of dependent people. For the Dogon,
on the other hand, age is of crucial importance. Social hierarchy is based on
seniority. Everything - the w hol e village, fields, crops, houses, lineages and
people - is 'owned' by the oldest man of the village (the Hogon). Old age is
considered an achievement and forms an important power base, even if old
men are infact quite dependent upon their younger k in fo lk forany real labour
and daily care. However, dependency on others is not viewed as a problem in
Dogon society, but as a mean ingfu l source of crucial relations.
Two stratégies against historv: towards an explanution
Both our examples of 'people wi thout history' appear to be quite different.
St i l l , their overall s i tuation in history, politics and ecology is remarkably
similar. Both live in the 'shatter zones' of impérial expansion in savannah
Africa, whence they 'fed' slave-hungry empires with Africa's foremost com-
modity, people. From a materialist viewpoint, such as Wolf's, more similarities
in life-styles would be expected, not just in infrastructure, but also in value
System and ideology. And thèse différences are considérable; within thé
context of small-scale village societies, Dogon and Kapsiki seem to represent
opposites in their styles of life. In order to explain this phenomenon, I shall
use Wolfs approach and by adding some refinements to his concepts, try to
pinpoint some spécifie historica! processes that may hâve shaped thèse
variations. My main argument is that there are différent types of shatter zones
as well as différent reactions to 'history'; both ecology and thé idiosyncrasy of
history account for a possibly wide variety of cultural reactions.
The first factor to consider is the habitat. In their ecology both areas show
some similarities, as we have seen. Yet, on closer inspection important
différences show. The Kapsiki s i tuat ion varies in some significant aspects from
thé Dogon. The Mandara mountains, where thé Kapsiki live, is an old volcanic
area, with a quite fertile plateau and slopes, where with little additional
manuring and a simple crop rotation permanent cultivation is possible6. Water
holes are not concentrated around the village, as water can be found all over
the plateau and slopes. In contrast, the Dogon plateau consists of sandstone,
giving off few minerais in érosion. The Dogon plains are, especially in thé
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immédiate vicinity of the falaise and scree, almost pure sand; whatever
minerais can be found are contained in thé végétation itself. The scree itself
is somewhat more fertile, but thé différence is not spectacular, and hère, too,
permanent cultivation is only possible through intensive manuring. Though
thé scree may contain the most coveted fields, it contains only a minute
fraction of thé total cultivable space. Access to water is easiest at the foot of
thé scree, close to thé villages, where in thé lowest part of the area a small
rivulet streams alongside thé scree in and after thé rainy season.
A second ecological factor is thé protection offered by thé habitat against
mounted slave raiders, or any cavalry. The Mandara mountains are much
higher than thé Bandiagara escarpment (resp. 1000 m and 500 m). The slopes
of thé Mandara mountains, where thé Kapsiki live and cultivate, are long,
steep and studded with rocks and boulders7. Thus, thé Kapsiki could mount
an adéquate défense over a long stretch of terrain, which enabled them to live
close to their fields and crops, at least a considérable part of them. In addition,
thé architecture of their houses offered possibilities for a spirited défense,
while fields afforded some minor défense possibilities.
The Dogon area, on thé other hand, consists of two flat parts with a cliff in
between. The plateau of Bandiagara was fairly accessible from ail directions
save the southeast, whereas riding through thé plains was very easy. It is just
at both sides of thé falaise that défense possibilities could be found. However,
thé scree does not reach more than 50 m in altitude, and is in fact a narrow
long ribbon alongside thé 150 km falaise, h was a long, drawnout défense zone.
Most Dogon fields in thé plains were unprotected, within easy reach of cavalry.
Dogon défense had to concentrate on thé village itself, making a dense
settlement imperative. Consequently, Dogon villages arose on those parts of
thé falaise where caverns in thé cliff and thé possibility climbing it offered
additional refuge for thé population. On top of the cliff, at the rim of the
plateau, thé villages were located behind crevasses and fissures or on small
élévations that offered protection. The Dogon had to cultivate in füll view of
the village as much as possible. At thé foot of thé cliff this shows in thé location
of thé toguna, thé men's houses, bui l t on places with a good view of the plains.
Old men of the village could perform an essential function in cultivation.
When thé young people moved to fields further out, some old men would climb
thé cliff, and from that vantage point 100 m above thé village warned with a
drum of eventual marauders.
In our second set of factors, the historica! ones, the traditions of migration
as well as military organization are relevant. We shall start with the military
situation. Kapsiki as wel! as Dogon had to cope with slave raiding Muslim
empires with a continuous hunger for slaves. However, in each case different
empires were at work, with different organizations and ways of raiding. The
Kapsiki confronted large empires whose geopolitical center was quite close to
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the i r mountain fortress. The capitals of the Kanem/Bornu empire and of the
Baghuirmi realm were a few days' mardi. The Mandara Sultanate, though
.smaller, was very close indeed, at the northern rim of the mountains. In addition,
this sultanate was either a fief of larger empires like Bornu and Sokoto or
suhjected to them and had to pay an additional tribute in slaves to the imperia!
centers. Sokoto of course was much further away, far in the northwest of present
day Nigeria. However, the emirs of Adamaoua, the easternmost Sokoto
province, mounted their opérations either from Yola or from Maroua, i.e. from
centers close to the mountains. All these emirates had a densely populated area
of potential slaves at their disposai within expédition distance. Consequently,
their slave raids were usually organized as large scale expéditions, with a large
mounted cavalry, aiming at capturing as many slaves as possible during one tryst,
both for themselves and as tribute for their overlords. Most of the prisoners were
not sold in the région (though Mora was an important slave market) but
transported to centers of the realm. From there they were redistributed, often
to plantation settleinents to produce food for the realm (Lovejoy 1983). The
raiders were not overly interested in having their captives bought back by the
local population; anyway, if they wanted cattie (about the only currency for
exchanging slaves), they captured them on their own8.
By contrast, the Dogon lived at a much greater geographical distance from
the impérial centers. Whereas this is evident in the case of the empire of Mali,
whose capital Kangaba was situated near the present-day border of Mali and
Guinea, it also holds for the empires of Songhay and Tucolor. Emirates at a
closer distance, such as Mossi and Masina Fuiani had much smaller political
Systems, that, in contrast with thé Cameroonian situation, paid no tribute to
any overlord (Johnson 1976). The larger realms either were founded by a quick
and superficial military conquest (like Tucolor which came closest to thé
Dogon area, in Bandiagara) or had the character of a trade state, like Songhai.
A well organized empire with a more or less functioning administration and
clérical institutions like Sokoto was absent in this part of West Africa.
Consequently, thé rôle of slaves was different in these emirates. Needed for
neither feeding a court nor the production of weapons for the army (Smaldone
1977), slaves were mainly used for domestic purposes, assisting families in
their productive activities. No plantat ion settlements are known from this
area. For some realms guarding cattie was an important slave task, as
transhumance was organized mainly through slave labour (Ba and Daget
1962). However, the number of slaves needed for this work, allowing for the
safety of the flock, was quite small. Wherever more slaves were available, they
tended to live in separate villages, like the Rimaibé, who as half-free clients
had a tribute relationship with their Fuiani lords.
The démographie density of the Dogon plateau and its adjoining Gourma
plains, the Dogon habitat, probably never exceeded the 15/km2, much lower
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than that of the Mandara mountains in Cameroon, where densities over
2
100/km are reported (Podlewski 1966). As a slave reserve the Bandiagara
area was much less interesting, especially for large scale enterprises. Thus, the
falaise was visited by small groups of mounted raiders, interested more in
immédiate gain than motivated by long-term tribute relations. In their
hit-and-run raids they tried to surprise a few unsuspecting Dogon in the early
morning, some women fetching water at the foot of the cliff, or some men
venturing out into the fields on their own. After catching them, the raiders
often seem to have negotiated with the village, either to have their captives
ransomed for cattie or other valuables (clothes, cowries), or to have them
exchanged for other prisoners more expendable in the eyes of the villages and
more interesting for the raiders (young girls seem to have served as a ransom
for adult men).
A historical factor of a different kind, which lies beyond the scope of Wolfs
analysis, is the spécifie character of the migration histories of the peoples in
question In ou r two cases différences show in their own définition of their
mytho-historical past. For the Kapsiki any notion of group identity beyond the
village level is of recent origin (Van Beek 1986a). The various villages that
make up the present-day Kapsiki/Higi conglomerate have their own particular
point of origin and migration history. Yet, on the whole, the points of departure
for the migrations are situated either in the mountain area itself or close to it.
The history of this area seems to be replète with small-scale movements,
migrations from one massif io the next, the migrants easily integrated into the
loosely-structured local organization. One single cultic center, Gudur, is often
mentioned as a point of origin, though it is also in the mountains; probably the
ritual eminence of this place has engendered the migration tradition. The
various groups, though subject to raids by a common enemy, never united
against the marauders, but seem throughout to have followed a strategy of
individual défense and withdrawal, dispersing over the least accessible niches
of the mountains - a process that must have go ne on long before the
nineteenth Century Fuiani jihad (Van Beek 1988a).
By contrast, Dogon history has a much larger scale. Their traditions link
them to the great Mali empire, with its center some 800 km to the southeast.
If this has any historical relevance - as is generally supposed - by implication
the Dogon would have migrated to their present habitat in about the fifteenth
Century. Though Dogon traditions differ considerably on the exact trail
followed to arrive at the falaise (some traditions would have them rounding
the whole Niger bend before arriving), one thing they concur on is the place
of origin: Mandé (Mali). In clear contrast to the Kapsiki, the Dogon were
recognizable as a distinct social group long before the arrivai of the French.
Consequently, they have a fairly clear sensé of collective identity beyond the
village level, much more pronounced than the Kapsiki. With great pride they
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point out the ancient settlements on the scree, stressing their kinship with the
royal Keita lineage of old Mandé. Their migration traditions, though varying
from place to place, all stress one migration as the point of departure for
Dogon history; in fact, the - mythical - order of arrivai at the cliff still governs
hierarchical relations in ritual. So, despite economie and politica! autonomy
of the villages, some 'tribal we-feeling' is present.
From these two sets of factors, ecological and historical, two stratégies for
défense can be made plausible. The Kapsiki strategy aimed at being as
inaccessible as possible for the cavalry, living and cultivating in remote,
défendable places. Though some ramparts were built against horses in valleys
narrow and steep enough to allow it, most often the Kapsiki relied on the
natural défense opportunités of the terrain itself. Their f 1rs t line of défense
was the individual household, and only when confronted with a larger enemy
force - which was often the case - the whole village united in the second line
of défense, rallying as many able-bodied warriors as they could muster. So the
main levels of défense organization were the individual household and the
village as a whole. Clans or wards could not serve as viable war units. On the
other hand the absence of a corporate middle level such as the ward or clan
made individuals vulnérable to another type of threat, war between the
villages. Single individuals or families working together on the fields could be
targeted by groups raiding from neighbouring villages, seeking vengeance for
previous killing or slaves to be ransomed for cattle. This threat was the main
reason to live in a somewhat dense seulement. However, war implied not only
danger and despair, it was a 'sport', a game, as well. In fact, this kind of war
was one of the few things by which a man could distinguish himself from his
kin and peers.
Dogon défense, on the other hand, was very much a group endeavour.
Though their area as a whole was easily accessible for mounted raiders, a
collective défense against a l imi tednumber of intruders was effective, whereas
individual seulement was very risky indeed. The main problem was to see the
marauders coming from a distance, so the Dogon relied on an early warning
System. Whenever raiders were spotted, their chances were almost ni), as a few
horsemen could easily be turned back by a whole village, even on foot. If
numbers were less advantageous for the Dogon, they could flee into the
village, where the narrow winding alleys and the closely packed huts offered
an adequate protection. In the last resort, they could climb into the caverns of
the cliff or - on the plateau - into the caves that dot the rugged landscape close
to the plateau rim. Of course, this last line of défense offered shelter for just
a few people, and probably was used very sparingly. The Standard use for the
caves was - and is - burial, which in itself demands for a safe place. Anyway,
this général défense strategy favoured a division of labour based on aee and
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mobility: the large category of young people cultivated in the fields under the
watchful eyes of the elders, seated high inside the village or on the plateau rim.
So communal labour as well as mutual complementarity of différent âge sets
fit in well with this war setting.
In contrast with the Kapsiki, the Dogon tried to adapt to their oppressors,
whose cultures were more similar to them, than was the case for the Kapsiki.
Though the Dogon never adopted or developed a real cavalry comparable to
the Fulani or Mossi, the introduction of horses did have some impact on them,
especially in those areas where the possibilities for défense were scarcer than
at the cliffside. For instance, the Dogon living on the plateau farther from the
rim did have a rôle in history in addition to being just potential slaves. In the
wars between the Masina realm and the Tucolor, the Dogon of Bandiagara
were actively involved, supporting the Tucolor against the Fulani of Masina
and later against the Sonrai of Timbouctou. With the waning of the Tucolor
empire, Bandiagara was its center; U mar is buried nearby. For the Dogon this
implied that they had to supply slaves (Gallais 1984: 56) and serve in the
Tucolor army, often as horsemen. They had, of course, to Islamize as well. For
the/a/aùe-dwelling Dogon, this had relatively l i t t le impact: the raids on their
villages were executed by the Samo, another tribute paying group, or in some
instances by plateau Dogon9.
All this history, evidently, occurred for both the Kapsiki and the Dogon
before the arrivai of the colonials. Their subséquent courses through history
vary as well. For the Kapsiki actual colonization came late. The Mandara area
had been traversed by one Gertnan column prior to World War I, and the first
three decades of this Century saw the most intense war between Fulani and
'Kirdi' in their history. Not before 1930 was any pacification attained, and only
after the World War II could one speak of a pax colonialis, while skirmishes
between Kapsiki villages persisted through the 50s, when actual pénétration
of the national state was under way. Thus, the Kapsiki area has gradually
evolved from a socially splintered slave raiding reserve, to a marginal area in
a nation-state, and thence into a tourist attraction (Van Beek 1986a) as well
as a group of traders. In most of their history, no ethnie unity or ethnie
we-feeling were discernible. As a - not overly cohesive - ethnie group, the
Kapsiki as such were created in the colonial era, to be marginalized later. Their
marginal position, one main attraction for tourism, has worked to their
advantage in trade. Straddling thé border with Nigeria at a spot with relatively
good transport facilities, thé Kapsiki succeed in dominating thé trade - or
smuggling - between thé two countries for most of the Mandara région.
For thé Dogon colonial history started much earlier. Already in 1896 they
fought a more or less final battle against thé French colonial army at Kassa,
and before the turn of the Century the area was considered 'pacified'. Their
incliKi'on intn thp Frp.nrh rnlonv of Frenrh We.st Afrira mcant :i
66 Histoiy und culture
recruitment of soldiers for both world wars, as wel! as a graduai introduction
of French colonial money, replacing cowries as the currency. In the inter-
bellum, the System of labour migration, st i l l en vogue today, developed; thé
able-bodied young men worked in thé big cities like Abidjan, Accra or Kumasi,
to reestablish themselves again at the falaise after either a season or some
years. This System, which also exists on thé Nigérian side of thé Kapsiki/IIigi
area, quickly became crucial for the economie prosperity of the villages. In
addition, thé Dogon refined their agricultural System and became thé main
cultivators of onions for thé entire région. As solid workers they gained a wide
renown in thé major cities, thus easily finding work whenever they set out to. At
présent, they are increasingly sought after by government and development
organizations as cadre. So, on thé whole iheir entry into thé nation state has been
much more graduai and, ail things considered, more successful than thé
Kapsiki's, even though their access to thé corridors of power is mostly blocked
by Bambara political domination. Dogon agriculture is inherently expansionist,
so after 'pacification' they rapidly swarmed out into the plains and plateau.
Theirs is an expanding population while the Kapsiki are static (Van Beek 1986b),
so pressure on environmental resources is mounting. In thé fragile ecology of
thé Sahelian plains this implies environmental dégradation, worsened by thé
récent years of drought. Thus, thé présent Dogon ecological picture is that of a
quite successful agricultural System, threatened by ils own success.
Conclusion
Processes in thèse 'shatter zones' differ considerably, despite their similarities.
Both societies have been marked by a particular interaction with 'history', each
in its own fashion. Sociopolitical fragmentation is common to both. Neither
thé Kapsiki nor the Dogon ever aimed at meeting the Muslim empires on their
own grounds: thé pressure of slave raiding never led to some larger military
organization, and there is no évidence of any tendency toward centralization
of power, which would hâve facilitated a more effective défense and a possibly
offensive action. Apparently, thé external threat brought about a fragmented
power system with very diffuse and reciprocal obligations. Some organization
on thé village level seems to be the most appropriate response to this kind of
pressure. Why so, is not wholly clear. Other instances of group défense against
Muslim expansion do show centralization of power: in some groups in thé
central Nigérian Plateau (Morrison 1982) and in thé Cameroonian plains
(Adler 1984) centralization under external threat can be seen. A wider
comparison is called for, to explore thèse contrasting processes of social
fragmentation and centralization in marginal areas. One factor that might be
important, in addition to habitat si tuation tvnc nf pn^mw nnH nnnuiitinn
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density, is thé présence of buffer groups. In both our cases no other groups
bear thé brunt of first attack, as none lived between the Dogon and Kapsiki
and their slave raiders. The central Nigérian plateau présents a différent
picture; there other non-Muslim groups lived between thé potential slaves and
their would-be masters (Morrison 1982), which might hâve dampened any
fragmentation processes.
Another factor could be thé avai labi l i ty of weaponry and horses. In our
cases, weapon production was more or less equal, both having few horses and
a simple iron technology, which might have been different in the Moundang
case (Adler 1984). The same holds for the position of domestic slaves, who
played little or no rôle in our cases, but may have been more important
elsewhere. Finally, overarching idéologies must be taken into account. Maybe
such a comparison could shed some light on the varying impact of different
types of warfare; after all, slave raiding is just a slice of the total gamut of
warlike relations characterizing much of Africa's history.
Both groups reacted in different ways to external pressure, but in both cases
the stratégies for défense could be rendered plausible from the variables
described. Each of these variables - physical environment, organization of
enemy forces, ethnie history - can be fil led in differently from both our cases;
we are not dealing with dichotomies hère. So any overview of the total range
of defensive reactions must await a larger comparative study. However, our
small 'controlled comparison' appcars to h in t tha t just a few options are open
for groups under these circu instances, which permeate the respective cultures
deeply.-ln what way these stratégies shape the societies is a hard question to
solve. In the last instance, this is the quest for cul tura l intégration. Wolf states:
... we can no longer think of societies as isolatcd and sclf-maintaining systems.
Nor can we imagine cultures as integratcd totalities in which each part con-
tributes to the maintenance oi'an organi^ccl, autonomous and enduring whole.
There are only cultural sels of pracliccs and ideas, put intoplaybydetcrminate
human actors under dctcrminatc circumstances. In the course of action, these
cultural sets are forever assembled, dismunllcil, and rcasscmbled, conveying
in variable accents the divergent paths of groups and classes (1982: 390-91).
The comparison of our two cases shows that both cultures can be profitably
viewed in their interaction with Muslim expansion. However, the use of terms
like 'strategy' and 'patterns of fragmentation' indicates that some cohérence
can befoundwithin these cultures. However materiallyfounded the formation
of value systems and idéologies may be, produced and used in power play and
domination, they still exhibit a certain degree of intégration. In the two cases,
Kapsiki as well as Dogon, the combination and recombination of social and
ideological éléments, however linked tip the processes are shown to be with
the idiosyncracy of history and the vagaries of ecology, do result in cohere-nt
Hrvtlï r>Hc^r\/**r't: 'infl fh*> £ * n'.irti^irvmt»:' nnint rvf
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'determinate human actors' succeed in constructing meaningful cultural
contexts. Kapsiki and Dogon, in thé course of their interaction with 'history',
managed to produce their own particular styles, formulated in their own
spécial cultural idiom. The two ways of assigning meaning diverge, a différence
that has to be rooted also in thé System of cultural meaning in each of the
groups. Neither thé rugged individualism of thé Kapsiki, nor the Dogon's
addiction to harmony are necessary givens of ecology and external history. It
seems however, that whenever a cul tural strategy has been adopted, this
'choice' will serve as an integrative precept for the rest of the culture, and as
such offers an important venue for culuiral and historical analysis. Thus, at
least in our two cases, Wolfs approach shows itself to be highly productive,
both through thé insights we gain into thé respective societies, and through
thé possibilities to arrive at more focused theoretical questions and frui t ful
propositions.
For comment on an earlier version, I am 'mdehied to Bon no Thoden van Velzen,
Miimiy Lust and Philip Bumtitim.
Notes
1. The Kapsiki/Higi slraddle thc border bel ween Nigeria and Cameroon; ihcy are called Higi in
Nigeria and Kapsiki in Cameroon. My research amongthem in 1971,1972-73,1979 and 1988,
mainly on thé Cameroonian side, was fundcd by grants from the Univcrsity of Utrecht and the
Dutch Foundation for thé Advancement of Tropical Research.
2. My anthropological research on thé Dogon was part of a larger mullidisciplinary project, and
took place in 1978,1979-80,1981,1982,1983,1984,1986 and 1989, fmancedby two grants from
thé Dutch Foundation for thé Advancemcnl of Tropical Research (WOTRO), ihe University
of Utrecht, Time-Lifc and the Dapper Foundation.
3. The name 'Mandara' refers to both an ethnie group and thé mountains. The Mandara group
is a relatively small Islamic group, living at thc Northern rim of the mountains. The Mandara
mountains serve as a habitat for many othcr, non-Moslim groups, such as thé Kapsiki.
4. This System is under pressure from thé Malian govcrnmcnt. In many villages chicfs or headmen
are chosen among thé 'younger old men', independent of their having an old surviving
patriarch.
5. l have no figures on divorce frequency, as this issue is extremely sensitive for thé Dogon and
does not lend itself to a quantitative approach. However, thé number of divorce cases known
tome isverysmall.
6. This fertility is clcarly illustrated in thé much more densely populated part of the Mafa, North
of thé Kapsiki, who manage to retain food self sufficiency with a population density of over
100/km2 (Podlewski 1%6).
7. This holds somewhat less for thé original Kapsiki settlements, which, like Mogodé, where
much of the research was donc, were insolier! on Ion nf nntrrnnninoc in ihp »nrlnlatm«
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plateau. However, thé gréât majority of historical villages were ail situated on top of the
mountain slopes. Thèse oulcroppings, offering a défense possibility for only a small popula-
tion, were deserted some three centuries ago, according to TL daling of shards.
8. Anyway, Kapsiki cattle were of a breed lhal does well in the mountains, but poorly in thé plains,
and as such were not much valued by thc Fulani.
9. Still, the cliff Dogon may hâve developed thé horse and cavalier motifs in their sculpture in
this pcriod; they still like to porlray thcmselvcs mounted, even if thé total number of horses is
low and has ncvcr been high.
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Economy and society in southwest Ethiopia.
The émergence of the 'Tishana'
JanAbbink
University of Nijmegen
This article bas two purposes. First, to provide a historical outline of the
Tishana or Me'en, a small 'tribal' group living in Southwest Ethiopia and
ethnographically as well as historically one of the least known populations in
thé area. Secondly, to illustrate thé importance of a political economy
approach in explaining such a process of tribal émergence. In writing this
article I derived inspiration from Eric Wolfs séminal book Europe and thé
people without history (1982). In an historical-anthropological approach, as
envisagea hère, thé interdependence of politico-économie factors on thé one
hand and social dynamics and cultural factors on thé other, both placed in a
'global' perspective, is axiomatic. One of thé merits of Wolfs book is to have
demonstrated thé need to rethink thé explanatory framework for research and
interprétation of traditional ethnography and anthropology on the basis of the
idea of what he has called thé 'global interconnection of human aggregates'
(Wolf 1982: 385).
Also for the study of the 'periphery' of Ethiopia, an African state never
really colonized and thus never as directly transformed by global, western
politico-économie forces as other African countries, this approach is important.
As I will demonstrate, wider processes of mercantile expansion and political
entrepreneurship played a vital rôle in the émergence of tribal units in an
obscure frontier area of Africa's oldest independent country . In outlining the
history of the so-called 'Tishana' it will be shown - if it still needs showing -
that the spécifie émergence and cultural form of a tribal ethnie group cannot
be understood within a classic case-study approach focussing on the group
itself. The Tishana social formation is the result of changing 'social alignments'
(Wolf 1982: 386) and adaptive responses of certain human groups within this
broader framework of historical and politico-économie forces. How this result
came about is what constitutes the history of the Tishana.
The problem
'Tishana' is the tribal name which Northern Ethiopians (niostly Amhara from
the Gojjam and Shewa régions in Central Ethiopia) gave to various groups of
Surma-soeaking semi-nomads, living in the areas they came to conquer after
